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RECENT CASES
WOPUCMENMS COMPENSATION -Liability for Injury Arising
Out of Horseplay.- Claimant while unloading material from a
truck for employer was suddenly and without Warning jokingly
seized by one of his legs by a fellow employee who was on the ground
and pulled off truck. As result claimant suffered permanent arm
injury. Claimant applied for workmen's compensation. The Indus-
trial Commission made an award of workmen's compensation to
claimant which was reversed by the lower court, whence this appeal.
HELD, reversed. Injury resulted from accident which arose out
of and was incidental to employment and was compensable. Allsep
v. Daniel Construction Co., 57 S. E. 2d 427 (S. C. 1950).
The Workmen's Compensation Laws constitute a form of social
legislation and were enacted primarily for the benefit, protection and
welfare of working men and their dependents. Courts have gener-
ally held that they should be accorded a liberal interpretation and in-
clusion of employees and employers rather than exclusion is favored
in order to promote justice and the public welfare. Cokely et al v.
Robert Lee, Inc. 197 S. C. 157, 14 S. E. 2d 889, (1935). Ham v.
Mullins Lumber Co., et al, 193 S. C. 66, 7 S. E. 2d 712, (1939);
Willson & Co. v. Matthews, 170 Va. 164, 195 S. E. 490, (1938).
But the Act must not be construed so as to work a hardship on the
employer and/or the insurance carrier. Hill v. Skinner et al, 195
S. C. 330, 11 S. E. 2d 386, (1939). The Supreme Court is not at
liberty to extend the meaning found in Workmen's Compensation
Act in order to provide a more liberal rule of compensation than that
which the Legislature has seen fit to adopt. Rudd v. Fairforest
Finishing Co., et al, 189 S. C. 188, 200 S. E. 727, (1938). CoDm ov
LAWS o SoTirrH CAROLINA, 1942, No. 7035-2(f) states that" 'Injury'
and 'personal injury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out
of and in the course of the employment, and shall include a disease
in any form, except where it results naturally and unavoidably from
the accident." "The two parts of the phrase 'arising out of and in
the course of the employment' are not synonymous, and both must
exist simultaneously before any Court will allow recovery under a
compensation act so worded. 'Arising out of' refers to the origin
and cause of the injury, whereas 'in the course of' refers to the time,
place, and circumstances of the occurrence." Branch et al. v. Pacific
Mills et al, 205 S. C. 353, 355, 32 S. E. 2d 1, (1944). An injury to
a workman does not have to be foreseen or expected to "arise out of
employment" but need only to have been reasonably incidental and
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connected to his employment or occurred within the period of his
employment, at a place where employees reasonably may be in the
performance of his duties. Eargle v. S. C. Electric & Gas Co. et al,
205 S. C. 423, 32 S. R. 2d 240, (1944). Johnson v. Merchant's Fer-
tilizer Co. et al, 198 S. C. 373, 17 S. R. 2d 695, (1940). "The word
'accident' as used in workmen's compensation has been defined as
an unlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or de-
signed by the person who suffered the injury." Green v. City of
Bennettsville, 197 S. C. 313, i5 S. R. 2d 334, (1941). HONNOLD ON
WORKMZN'S COMMPNSATION, Vol. I, Sect. 85, Page 85. The older
cases denied recovery for injury resulting from "horesplay" as not
"arising out of and in the course of employment". Pacific Employ-
ers' Ins. Co. v. Div. of Ind. Accidents & Safety, 209 Cal. 656, 289
P. 619, (1930). But more recent cases ruled that a workman is en-
titled to recover irrespective of fault if the injury arises out of and
in the course of the employment or if there is substantial doubt of
the propriety of such conclusion. Pelfrey v. Oconee County, 207 S. C.
433, 36 S. R. 2d 297, (1945) ; Chambers v. Union Oil Co., 199 N. C.
28, 153 S. R. 594, 596, (1920). The majority of courts today still
give lip-service to the doctrine that "aggressors" cannot "profit by
their own wrong" but the modern trend is clearly towards a more
liberal view as to compensability of injuries to employees. This is
especially true in construing the phrase "arising out of" the employ-
ment. Mack v. Branch, No. 12, 207 S. C. 258, 35 S. A. 2d 838,
(1945); Pelfrey v. Oconee County, supra. Today it is common
knowledge that when men are gathered together at work they are
given to pranks which sometimes result in injuries and it is one of
the anticipated risks of employment. These things are not unnatural,
but natural, and the ordinary outcropping of industrial contact be-
tween men of all classes and types and such risks therefore are inci-
dent to the business and grow out of it. Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk
Mills, 229 N. Y. 470, 128 N. R. 711, 13 A. L. R. 522, (1920);
Chambers v. Union Oil Co., supra. Courts thus hold that practical
joking or skylarking does not usually break the course of employ-
ment. Payne v. Industrial Commission, 129 N. R. 122, 295 Ill. 388,
13 A. L. R. 518, (1920). The greater weight of authority today is
to entitle compensation to non-participants or innocent victims in-
jured as the result of horseplay and the modern trend is to even allow
recovery to aggressors although on this the courts are split. Pacific
Employers' Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 158 P. 2d
9, 159 A. L. R. 319, 325-32, (1945). Industrial Commission v. Mc-
Carthy, 295 N. Y. 443, 68 N. R. 2d 434, (1946).
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The result reached in the instant case is undoubtedly correct as the
claimant was an innocent victim of the horseplay of his fellow-em-
ployee. The courts feel that horseplay when resulting in injury and
incidental to the employment should be compensable in meeting the
spirit of the compensation act. The courts recognize throughout the
cases that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a form of social legis-
lation, and primarily for the benefit and protection of the employee
and thus accord a very liberal and broad interpretation in order to
carry out the purpose of the act.
MEiTON KLIGMAN.
CONSTRUCTION OF FEDERAL PENAL STATUTES - Appli-
cation of Doctrine of "Ejusdem Generis" in Light of Congressional
Purpose. - Defendant was charged with the shipment of obscene
phonograph records in interstate commerce in violation of Section 245
of the United States Criminal Code which makes illegal the inter-
state shipment of any "obscene... book, pamphlet, letters, writing,
print or other matter of indecent character". Defendant was found
guilty by the District Court and assessed a fine. By applying the doc-
trine of "ejusdem generis" the Court of Appeals reversed this decision.
Upon a writ of certiorari to the U. S. Supreme Court HELD, Re-
versed. The doctrine of "ejusdem generis" is not applicable where
its application would defeat the obvious purpose of the legislature.
U. S. v. Alpers, 70 S. Ct. 352 (1950).
In the construction of statutes, the rule of "ejusdem generis" is that
where general words follow the enumeration of particular persons or
things, the general words shall be construed as applicable only to
persons or things of the same general nature or kind as those enumer-
ated. Hise v. City of North Bend et al, 138 Ore. 150, 6 P. 2d 30
(1931). The rule finds support in the conviction that if the legisla-
ture had intended the general words to be used in an unrestricted sense
the particular classes would not have been mentioned. CRAwFoRD,
STArUTORY CONSTRUCTION, Sec. 191. It is particularly applicable to
statutes defining crimes and regulating their punishment. First Na-
tional Bank of Anamoose v. U. S. 206 F. 374 (1913). However, the
doctrine of "ejusdem generis" is a rule of construction, to be used in
ascertaining the intent of the legislature, and not for the purpose of
subverting such intention when ascertained. Mid-Northern Oil Co.
v. Walker et al, 268 U. S. 45 (1925). AS all other aids or rules of
statutory construction, its prime purpose is to determine the inten-
tion of the law making body. GrosJean v. American Paint Works, La.
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App., 160 So. 449 (1935). It cannot control where the plain purpose
and intent of the legislature would thereby be hindered or defeated.
State v. Gallagher, 101 Ark. 593, 143 S. W. 98 (1912). It is a mis-
take to allow the rule to pervert the construction. City of Fort Smith
v. Gunter, 106 Ark. 371, 154 S. W. 181 (1913). When the words
of the act are clear in meaning and require no interpretation, the doc-
trine of "ejusdem generis" will not be applied. Mills et al v. City of
Barbourville et al, 273 Ky. 490, 117 S. W. 2d 187 (1938). The rule of
"ejusdem generis" was not applied where defendant induced a mis-
carriage in a woman by having her run up and downstairs, and he
was held to have violated a statute which read "medicine, drugs ....
or shall use or employ any instrument whatsoever". State v. Miller,
90 Kan. 230, 133 Pac. 878 (1913). The U. S. Supreme Court would
not apply the doctrine when it said that the holding of an officer to
avoid arrest is a holding in violation of a statute making it unlawful
to transport in interstate commerce any persons unlawfully seized
"and held for ransom or reward or otherwise". Gooch v. U. S., 297
U. S. 124 (1936).
The intent of the legislature in passing this act is obvious and un-
questionable. It was to prevent the transmission in interstate com-
merce of any indecent matter. To have applied the doctrine of "ejus-
dem generis" in this case would have frustrated the purpose of the
act. The Court correctly held that the doctrine of "ejusdem generis" is
only a rule of construction and should be used as such. To apply it
where the intent of the legislature needs no interpretation or expla-
nation would enfeeble the penal attempts of the law making bodies.
If the doctrine of "ejusdem generis" had been applied in this case it
would have served to place a premium on the invention of new me-
chanical processes with which to evade the law.
CHARLES S. BERNSTUIN.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION - Employee's Right of Elec-
tion Under Compensation Acts. - Plaintiff filed a claim against em-
ployer under Workmen's Compensation Act, S. C. CODE ANN. 7035-
11 (1942), to recover compensation for accidental injury inflicted
by third party tort feasor. Plaintiff had previously signed a release
to the third party without the knowledge of his employer, after re-
ceiving a compromise settlement. Compensation was awarded Plain-
tiff by the South Carolina Industrial Commission and was upheld
by lower court. On appeal, HELD, Reversed. Employee who is in-
jured in the course of his employment and who, without the consent
of his employer, makes a binding release to the third party is barred
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from recovery under the Workmen's Compensation Act, CODE 1942,
SEcs. 7035-et seq. 7035-11. His release constituted an election of
remedies and destroyed his employer's statutory right of subrogation.
Gardner v. City of Columbia Police Department, 57 S. Rh. 2d 308
(1950).
The Workmen's Compensation Act was adopted to protect workers
from the hazards of their employment. Cokely et al. v. Robert Lee,
Inc., 197 S. C. 157, 14 S. E. 2d 889 (1941). It is not based on the
principal of tort liability but may be considered as an operating ex-
pense. See Behrendt, THE RATIoNAIE o THE ELECTION oF REME-
DIES UNDER WORKMEN'S COMP NSATION ACTs, 12 U. of Chi. L.
Rev. 231, 235 (1945). It created a new right in the employee and
is part of his contract of employment. CODE SEC. 7035-6. Brown v.
Town of Patrick, 212 S. C. 236, 24 S. E. 2d 365 (1943). The Com-
pensation Act should be liberally construed in order to carry into ef-
fect its beneficial purposes, but a court should not do violence to the
Act in order to aid either party. Taylor v. Mount Vernon Woodberry
Mills, 211 S. C. 414, 45 S. E. 2d 809 (1947). An injured employee
may at his option either claim compensation or proceed at law against
third party tort feasor to claim damages, but he should not be en-
titled to collect from both. Walters v. Eagle Indemnity Co., 166 Tenn.
383, 61 S. W. 2d 666, 88 A. L. R. 654 (1933). If employee procures a
judgment in action at law, he is barred by remedy for an award under
Workmen's Compensation. Tuller et al. v. Southern Electric Ser-
vice Co., 200 S. C. 246, 20 S. E. 2d 707, 710 (1942). A release was
tantamount to the procurement and collection of a judgment in an
action at law as provided by Sec. 7035-11 of the Code. Taylor v.
Mount Vernon Woodberry Mills, 211 S. C. 414, 45 S. E. 2d 809
(1947). An injured employee by accepting a settlement from a third
party releases the employer from liability since the release destroys
the insurer's right of subrogation against the third party. Texas Em-
ployer's Ins. Ass. v. Brandon, 89 S. W. 2d 982 (Tex. 1936).
In light of the fact that the Compensation Act was enacted primarily
for the protection and benefit of the worker, the majority decision of
the court seems neither just nor equitable. In opposition to the South
Carolina ruling, many states have held that a release to a third party
without the knowledge of the employer neither bars the employee's
right to Workmen's Compensation nor the insurer's right of subro-
gation. Rosenblum v. Hartford News Co., 92 Conn. 398, 103 A.
120 (1918), Renner v. Model Laundry, Cleaning & Dyeing Co.,
91 Iowa 1288, 184 N. W. 611 (1921). It is well known that many
people will pay a nominal sum in order to obtain a release and avoid
5
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litigation. In many instances the injured employee will compromise
the settlement not realizing that he is barring himself from Work-
men's Compensation. A more just and equitable decision would ap-
pear to allow the injured party to recover the difference between the
amount he received from the third party tort feasor and the amount
he would have received under the Compensation Act. Maryland Cas.
Co. v. McCrary, 29 F. Supp. 950 (1939).
SAM P. MANNING.
UNITED STATES - Liability of the Government on Contracts
Made by It's Agents. - On March 7, 1942, a prisoner was shot and
seriously wounded by agents of the Treasury Department while at-
tempting to escape arrest. He was immediately taken to Plaintiff
hospital for treatment, the agents agreeing on behalf of the Treasury
Department to assume all costs necessary for treatment. About seven
months later the indictment against the prisoner was dismissed and
he was released from constructive custody. On September 17, 1942,
the U. S. Marshall served Plaintiff with a copy of the order which
provided that the U. S. would no longer be responsible for any bills
incurred by this man. On November 21, 1942, the Treasury De-
partment made full payment for services rendered up to September
16, 1942. The patient, not in a condition to be moved, was treated
until January 1, 1949. Plaintiff, relying upon the original contract
by the agents, brought this action to recover for the services ren-
dered between September 17, 1942, and January 1, 1949. Defendant
moved to dismiss the action on the ground that the complaint failed
to state a claim against the Defendant upon which relief could be
granted. HELD, Motion granted. Defendant accepted liability for
the prisoner during custody, paid all expenses during that time, and
neither Federal officers nor anyone else had authority to enter into a
contract or bind the Government to any greater degree, for the United
States is not liable for the continuing care of a prisoner once out of
custody. Columbia Hospital of Richland County v. U. S., 87 Fed.
Supp. 535. (E. D. S. C. 1949).
A private agent may subject his principal to liability to a third per-
son where he is acting within the implied or apparent scope of his
authority, as if he had personally entered into the transaction, even
if the act was done in excess of actual authority and instructions.
RZSTATZMtNTS, AGENCY, § 140, (1933). Furthermore, if an unfore-
seen situation arises for which the terms of the authorization make
no provision and it is impracticable for the agent to communicate
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with the principal, he is authorized to do what he reasonably believes
necessary to remedy the situation. Although he is at fault for the
creation of the situation which causes his to depart from the letter of
his instructions, he is authorized to act. RESTATIMENNTS, AGElCY,
§ 47, (1933). Where the exigencies are of so pressing a nature that
immediate action must be taken to relieve the injured party or to pre-
serve his life, the agent has authority to bind the principal to pay for
such services as the emergency demands. Vandalia Ry. v. Bryan, 60
Ind. App. 223, 110 N. E. 218 (1915); Ohio & M. Ry. v. Early, 141
Ind. 73; 40 N. E. 257, 28 L. R. A. 546 (1895). However, the princi-
pal is not liable for the services rendered after the emergency has
passed. If the Plaintiff wishes to hold him liable for subsequent ser-
vices, he must make a special contract with him. Holmes v. MacCallis-
ter, 123 Mich. 493; 82 N. W. 220, 48 L. R. A. 396 (1900) ; Salter v.
Neb. Telephone Co., 73 Neb. 373; 112 N. W. 600, 13 L. R. A. (n. s.)
545 (1907). The principle that the Government is not bound by the
unauthorized acts of its agents was set forth in the landmark case of
Lee v. Munroe, 7 Cranch 366, (U. S. 1813), and has been followed
uniformly by later decisions. Strasbury v. U. S., 8 Wall. 33, (U. S.
1869); Whitesides v. U. S., 93 U. S. 247, (1876); Jacob Reed's
Sons v. U. S., 273 U. S. 200, (1927) ; Fries v. U. S., 170 F. 2d 726
(C. C. A. 6th 1948). The Government is neither bound nor es-
topped by the acts of its agents outside the limits of their authority.
Utah Power & Light Co. v. U. S., 273 U. S. 389, (1917) ; Federal
Crop Insurance Co. v. Merrill, 332 U. S. 380, (1947) ; see 34 VA.
LAw RvImw 477-9. And it can only be bound by the acts of an
agent which are within limitations of his authority, not only with
respect to express contracts but to implied contracts as well. Eastern
Ext. Australasia & China Tel. Co. v. U. S., 251 U. S. 355, (1920);
Fries v. U. S., supra. Furthermore, it is well settled that since the
powers and duties of public officers are defined and limited by pub-
lic law, all persons dealing with the Government are chargeable with
notice as to the extent of the agent's authority and it is the duty of
such persons to ascertain the power and authority of these agents.
Whitesides v. U. S., supra; Hume v. U. S., 132 U. S. 406, (1889) ;
U. S. v. North American Co., 253 U. S. 330, (1920) ; U. S. v. Willis,
164 F. 2d 453, (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
On first impression, the result reached in the principal case seems
inequitable, as Plaintiff, through the unauthorized acts of Govern-
ment agents, has been saddled with the burden of care and treatment
for an indefinite period of time of a patient whose permanent dis-
ability was caused by these agents. There is little hope to recover
7
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for services rendered after the patient was released from construc-
tive custody, for the patient could ill afford to pay. Also, it seems
harsh to say that Plaintiff had constructive notice of the Federal
statutes dealing with the expenses and subsistence of prisoners or to
say that Plaintiff should have investigated to see whether the United
States was liable or not before undertaking to aid the man in such
an emergency situation. However, even if this were a case involv-
ing private agents, the principal would only be liable for those ser-
vices rendered during the emergency and there would have to have
been a special contract made with him to render him liable for any
subsequent services. The courts are not prone to depart from the
well-established and long-followed principles. A departure from these
principles would mean a veritable deluge of litigation, for our Gov-
ernment today is far-reaching and there are thousands and thousands
of officers and agents. Such departures would tend to undermine the
immunity of the sovereignty. Although in the application of these
principles we sometimes gain harsh results which affect our emotional
tendencies, there are many results reached in applying the same prin-
ciples that arouse within us no sense of injustice whatsoever. If you
are to have a workable rule or principle, you must follow it as closely
as possible and not riddle it or undermine it with numerous exceptions.
H. P. SMITH.
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION- Effect of Compromise as a Fa-
vorable Termination. - Defendant caused a warrant to be issued
against plaintiff, manager of a turkey farm belonging to defendant.
Plaintiff, having been placed in jail and later released on bond, en-
tered into a cash settlement with defendant, voluntarily, in order to
secure the dismissal of the criminal case. Plaintiff protested his in-
nocence at the time of payment and stated that he was making pay-
ment under protest because he had to report for work on a new job
on the next day. After the compromise, plaintiff brings suit for
malicious abuse of process and malicious prosecution. In the U. S.
District Court the plaintiff received a verdict in both cases. An ap-
peal was taken in the malicious prosecution case. On appeal, HELD,
Reversed. Plaintiff, by voluntarily entering into a compromise in
order to secure the dismissal of the criminal charge, and not having
been under duress at the time, estops himself from bringing an action
for malicious prosecution. Leonard, et al v. George, 178 F. 2d 312
(1949).
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In order to maintain a suit for malicious prosecution, plaintiff must
allege and prove that the prosecution has terminated in his favor.
Brantley v. Rhodes-Haverty Furniture Co., 131 Ga. 276, 62 S. E. 222
(1908). Termination of the prosecution by a compromise between
the parties is not such a favorable termination as to allow the defen-
dant to later bring an action for malicious prosecution. Waters v.
Winn, et al, 142 Ga. 138, 82 S. E. 537, (1914); Jennings v. Clear-
water Mfg. Co., 171 S. C. 498, 172 S. R. 870, (1934). But the Com-
promise must have been understandingly and voluntarily made. White
v. International Text Book Co., 56 Iowa 210, 136 N. W. 121, (1912).
If payment is made by the person arrested, under protest and for
the sake of obtaining his liberty from duress, he is not estopped from
showing the want of probable cause in a subsequent action for ma-
licious prosecution. Morton v. Young, 55 Me. 24, 92 Am. Dec. 565,
(1867). In a compromise, the question of the guilt or innocence of
the accused is left open. Having bought peace, the accused may not
thereafter assert that the proceedings have terminated in his favor.
REsTATEENT, ToRTs § 660 (1938). Where substantial issues of fact
have been presented, upon conflicting evidence, it may be proper, or
even necessary to submit such issues to a jury. White v. International
Text Book Co., supra. But the fact that the accused initiated the
negotiations which resulted in the compromise, after he had been ad-
mitted to bail, on a charge of obtaining goods by false pretenses, was
held to negative the theory that the settlement was made under coer-
cion or duress, rather than being voluntary. Under these conditions,
there is no necessity for sending the case to the jury. Jones v. Donald
Co., 137 Miss. 602, 102 So. 540, (1925). The weight of authority
is, however, that there is no necessity of showing that the plaintiff
procured the settlement. A showing that the compromise was made
voluntarily and with the consent of plaintiff, will prevent the case
from going to the jury, and will raise the presumption that it was
not under duress or coercion. Glidewell v. Murray-Lacey Co., 124
Va. 563, 98 S. R. 665, (1919); Bell Lumber Co. v. Graham, 74 Colo.
149, 219 Pac. 777, (1923).
It is submitted that, on the facts involved in this case, the Court
reached the only correct and just decision possible. The law seems
well settled that, in the absence of coercion or duress, a compromise
made to secure a release of a prior action, will estop the accused
from later bringing an action for malicious prosecution. Certainly
it cannot be maintained that plaintiff was under any duress when he
voluntarily agreed to the compromise. True, he might have been
inconvenienced slightly, but that amount of inconvenience is to be
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expected in any litigation. Although protested his innocence at the
time, the effect of these protestations was negatived by the compro-
mise. The court correctly ruled as a matter of law that the compro-
mise was not such a favorable termination as would allow plaintiff
to bring an action for malicious prosecution.
EUGENE I. NETTLES
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